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Abstract
The main contribution of this thesis is a game that allows each player to learn about auctions,
rational behaviour in auctions and auction algorithms. It is meant to translate auction theory
into a more easily understandable form by letting players apply their understanding during the
game. The thesis also discusses the impact of omission of various assumptions like independent
valuation of goods by agents or adoption of non-risk-neutral strategies that lead either to risk-
avoidance or risk-seeking. It also describes the process of designing the artificial intelligence and
gives reasons for favouring certain approaches over others.
The game can serve as a basis of a more complex project, since its design and implementation
can be expanded on. The project allows for auctions, designs, implementation of the AI etc. to
be complemented by new ideas, and there is also a possibility of adding new types of buildings,
auctions etc. This is also true for ways of upgrading buildings and research which might also be
improved. In this way the game could be brought even closer to reality and could potentially
bring deeper understanding of auctions and economical behaviour. This project could thus be
used as a basis for an even more complex and intriguing computer game.
Abstrakt
Hlavní přínosem této práce je hra, která umožňuje každému hráči učit se o aukcích, racionál-
ním chování v aukcích a aukčních algoritmech. Hra převádí aukční teorii do lépe pochopitelné
formy a tím umožňuje hráčům, aby během hry aplikovali své poznatky. Práce také roze-
bírá důsledky vynechání různých předpokladů jako nezávislost ohodnocení zboží agentem nebo
strategií zahrnujících riskatní postoj, závislosti na nichž je agent buď nakloněný riskování, nebo
zdrženlivý. Práce také popisuje proces navrhování umělé inteligence a udává důvody pro použití
určitých typů řešení namísto jiných, původně zvažovaných.
Hra může sloužit jako jádro rozsáhlejšího projektu, vzhledem k tomu, že její návrh a implemen-
tace je možno rozšířit. Projekt umožňuje rozšířit aukce, implementaci umělé inteligence atd. o
nové myšlenky. Rovněž je možné přidat nové typy budov, aukcí atd. To samé se týká způsobů
vylepšování výzkumů a budov, které mohou být rovněž vylepšeny. Tímto způsobem se hra může
více přibližovat realitě a přinášet o něco hlubší pochopení aukcí a chování ekonomiky. Tento
projekt se tak může stát základem pro komplexnější a ještě poutavější hru.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to study the application of multi-agent systems and auction algo-
rithms in creating an economy-focused multi-player strategic video game. The game presents
three different types of auctions for the players to participate in and introduces the basics of
auction theory. The point of the game is to introduce the player to the differences between
auction types in an entertaining way, playing against the AI. Moreover it makes use of the same
algorithms that can be later encountered in different circumstances and therefore can be useful
as a demonstration of their functionality.
It is useful to study auction algorithms since they are frequently used in auction houses,
markets and other places concerned with buying and selling goods. They can also be used for
solving of the scheduling 1 and assembling 2 problems. In the game the players use auctions to
trade resources which are produced in their mines. [4].
The multi-agent systems also have a wide range of applications. They are used for example to
create the AI of various games that usually replaces the human as an opponent [4] Furthermore,
the motivation for studying multi-agent systems often stems from interest in artificial(software
or hardware) agents, for example software agents living on the Internet as the Internet can be
viewed as the ultimate platform for interaction among self-interested, distributed computational
entities or hardware agents for example autonomous robots in a multi-robot setting. [4] The
multi-agent systems are also used in applications that include transportation or logistics [2] and
in the film industry. [6]
1.1 Goals
The three main objectives of the game are:
• To design an economically-focused multi-player game and create a competitive environ-
ment, where all the players have equal starting positions and their main mode of interac-
tion is through various types of auctions in which the players trade resources which they
produce.
• To create the game, including the implementation and graphics necessary to present the
game to the player.
1 example: Each runway at an airport can only accommodate one plane at a time. Airlines (agents) have costs
related to delay of their flights (task). The task is to use the runways as efficiently as possible, with minimum
time between the flights. [1] (source includes more examples).
2 example: A manager employs three people (agents) in three different cities. He needs to move them to three
other cities. Of course the cost of fuel differs with distance. The task is to determine where to send which agent
in order to minimize airfare.
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• Let the players learn about the basics of auctions through playing the game.
1.2 The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows:
• The first part deals with the game system, the goals and principles of the game. Further-
more it explains the drawbacks of the ideas that were eventually not used. It deals in
detail with the individual parts of the game such as the buildings, research, resources etc.
Furthermore, it explains the game evaluation and the IPs.
• The aim of the second part is to introduce and discuss the English, Vickrey and Dutch
auctions and to present the auction definitions.
• The third part focuses on the artificial player and describes how he decides on a game
strategy with regard to which he invests in the buildings and research.
• The fourth part deals with the auction algorithms used in the game and the ways in which
the AI player bids in the auctions. It explains when the result of an auction is advantageous
for the bidder and when for the seller, how the bidder acts in the auction and how the risk
attitude and dependence of agent values influence his decisions.
• The last three chapters sum up the results, consider the future work and improvements
that the game may include and provide a conclusion to the thesis.
The contents of the enclosed CD are described in the appendix. [39]
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2 Last Planet - The Game
We will now discus the game default setting and starting conditions. We will also include
descriptions of buildings and research used in the game and include an example of the process
of the game.
2.1 The Game Setting
Goal of the Game Last planet is an Economy focused multi-player strategy video game. The
goal of the game is to secure dominant economic position in the trade with resources by building
and improving a city (for example by building mines and doing research) and trading with other
players. At the start of the game the players have the same conditions, the starting coordinates
being set at random. The game setting pushes players to focus on one resource. Therefore the
player has to choose a resource at the outset of the game and adopt a corresponding strategy
Game Evaluation The first problem to solve is evaluation. For this purpose we defined
influence points (IP ). Each time any player spends his resources, wins or creates an auction or
in any way influences the game, he earns influence points (IP ). Since this type of evaluation for
the most part depends on the market, it is necessary for the player to participate in transactions
that are presented in the form of auctions, which consist the main part of the game. Throughout
the game the IPs of the player are compared with the others’. When the best player’s earn
reaches 100+X%3 of the second player’s earn, the game ends and he wins.
Game Progress Structure At the start of the game each player has the same starting
conditions except the position which is selected randomly. The players build different types of
buildings4 In order to unlock the research lab, the players have to build a power station and
upgrade it at least to level 3. When the research lab is finished, the players can start investing
in research. Each player starts with the same default amount of resources. Creating an auction
in this part of the game is extremely disadvantageous due to the fact that the player has no
possibility to invest money.
In an early stage of the game each player should decide which resource he will be focused on.
If the player focuses on one resource the total production at the end of the game will be much
higher, because the increase between levels is not linear5 the other resources can be obtained in
auctions. Each player starts to upgrade the buildings as well as the research lab, which unlocks
3X is optional and can be set before the game starts (X ∈ 〈20; 100〉 ∧ 10|X ). The available definitions of
economic dominance proved unsuitable for the purposes of this game since they pertain to a market consisting of
50 or more firms and the game is structured for 2 to 8 players. [7] [8]
4Terms written in italics in this paragraph are later discussed in detail.
5further discussed in 2.2.
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the research. However it is not yet advantageous to invest in them. The upgrades bring money
to the player. The danger that appears here and lasts until the end of the game is the limits of
population and energy. They are often overstepped and then the player has to avoid sanctions.
It is still unlikely to see an auction in this part of the game.
In the middle of the game the players usually have more of certain resource then they need
and therefore the first auctions are created. The game offers three types of auctions - English,
Dutch and Vickrey. In this part of the game the player still has the possibility to build buildings
but can also start upgrading the research. In this or the next phase of the game certain buildings
can be rebuilt in order to save space or improve their parameters.
By the end of the game there is no free area left to build buildings and place saving takes
place. At this point there are usually many simultaneous auctions and the players should
concentrate on doing the research.
At any time in the game the players may use direct trade in which the players can change
their money for resources or resources for money at disadvantageous exchange rates. The price
set for the individual resources helps the players to assess their value in the game.
At the end of the game the players have an opportunity to see their exact IP s, which are
not shown during the game. The winner of the game is the player who gained the most IP s.
Figure 1: Graphic representation of the final score
Resources Earning and Valuation Players can spend money, stones, metals and minerals.
Each resource has different value: stones - IP/1000 units,metals - 1.5IP s/1000 units, minerals -
3IP s/1000 units and money - IP/1000 units. Some resources are easier to earn so their value is
lower. It cannot be said which resource is the most advantageous to focus on because it depends
mainly on other players’ selections.
Money After upgrading a building or conducting a research, the player earns a certain amount
of money according to the level of that building or research after the upgrade. It is not enough
to hold the game in optimal state since updating gradually becomes more and more complicated
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and eventually there is no money income in the game. It would not be logical if money, which
is needed to do research, to participate in auctions and to construct some of the buildings, were
unreachable.
For this reason each player also earns money through taxes. At certain time intervals, players
receive money depending on the population they have. This income is calculated logarithmically
due to fact that the main population increase comes from buildings and rises exponentially.
Figure 2: Graphic representation of the resources
Energy and Population As figure 2 shows, population and energy are rather similar to
resources, but unlike them they can be exceeded.
If a part of the player’s population is not accommodated, it will reflect in problems such
as strikes and riots, which in the game result in lowering of the production. The extent of the
decrease is determined according to the degree to which the population is exceeded (a small
degree of overpopulation would not lead to great protests). The point of reference is the ratio
between the lodging at the disposal and the lodging in demand, which, if the population is
exceeded, is always lower than 1. Moreover, the process should not be linear, since if there were
25% living outside the city, the situation would be much calmer than at 50%, in which case
it would be near fatal. For this reason the ratio is considered square. This means that if the
population is exceeded by 5% (which is relatively high), the decrease in production is not 5%
but 9%, in order to approach reality. The divergence increases in a logical way, for example at
50% the production is only a quarter of its original amount.
If the energy consumption is exceeded, the player is forced to buy it for its market price.
Energy as such cannot be traded, but in the game its exchange ratio is determined by the amount
owned by the other players and the amount of energy available, same as the other resources.
All the resources can be bought outside auctions, however their price is very high, making it
disadvantageous6.
How to Avoid Sanctions Since the repercussions for exceeding the limits are fairly severe,the
players can reduce the production of certain buildings, since lower production lowers the energy
consumption and requires less population. It allows the players to reduce losses by making the
reduction in the district where it is most advantageous. The Research lab does not have any
6further discussed below
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production but its activity can also be reduced, which affects its functionality in a different way.
For example if a player reduces the Research lab which is on level 3 to 60% of its activity he
will not be able to upgrade research to level 2 or more. If he leaves it at 70% he will not be able
to upgrade to level 3 but he can upgrade to level 2.
Remaining Area and Score As demonstrated in the figure 2 there are two other values in
the panel of resources.
Remaining area states the amount of upgrades that remains until the starting area is fully
occupied. The research lab is the only building which does not require any building area in
order to be upgraded.
IP percentage shows how many percent behind the best player’s score the player is. If the
player selected has the highest score the sign is negative and it shows his lead compared with
the second player.
Direct Trade The players can see the exchange rates of the resources and may use the direct
trade, avoiding the auction system. However the direct trade is very disadvantageous since the
other players, especially artificial, may use it for calculating their bids. Exchange rates are
calculated from the respective amounts of the resources in the market.
• First of all the combined income of all the players for all the resources is converted to IP s.
• Then the player takes the total game income for one resource (in IP ) and divides it by
the combined income to get the ratio between them.
• In the next step the result is divided by 1/3, which gives us the proportion between the
ideal state and the real state.
• This proportion is finally used to calculate the exchange rate
The exchange rate is counted as:
ERb = 3.R.RV /unit and ERs = R.RV3 /unit, (1)
where R is the mentioned proportion between ideal and real states.
It means for example for metals:
ERb =
9RV 2st.Gainst
RVst∗Gainst+RVme∗Gainme+RVmi∗Gainmi /unit and
ERs =
RV 2st.Gainst
RVst∗Gainst+RVme∗Gainme+RVmi∗Gainmi /unit.
ERb is the exchange rate - when buying for each unit of the purchased resource the player pays
ERb unit(s) of money. In the same way, ERs is the exchange rate when the player is selling (for
1 unit of a resource he gets ERs of money). Constant 3 in the equation (1) is just a reducing
constant to make the trade less advantageous which should force players to participate more in
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auctions.
The last problem to solve regarding direct trade is the energy cost. As we already mentioned
in the previous paragraphs, the penalization for exceeding the energy limit requires the energy
value to be set. The value for one unit of energy is set to:
ERb =
PLmax
MN , where PLmax is the amount of energy in the player’s possession, MN is the
amount of energy in the whole game.
Figure 3: Graphic representation of the direct trade
Influence points as Evaluation Since the IP s, which decide the game, are counted from
the start of the game, there is a danger that the first player that builds a building automatically
wins the game. The first possible solution for this problem was to start counting after a certain
amount of time, when all the players will have reached a minimum level. However, this solution
lacked realism, since there is no reason to start comparing the incomes only after a certain period
of time. When a firm comes to the market it has to take the rivals in consideration from the
start. The solution that was eventually used supposes that the players possess the building area
from the start, including basic facilities necessary to live, and therefore they don’t start with
0IP .
At first the game was meant to be time-limited and end after a set amount of time. The
advantage of this option was that the game would be strictly timed. However, it would mean
that the game could end before any of the players obtained economical dominance, therefore
resulting in a tie. Moreover, it does not encourage the players to be as competitive as in the
case of finishing by real percentage dominance of IP .
Finally there was a possibility to include a military part in the game and also to add an
option of transporting resources between players by ships. This would allow the players to
declare war or steal resources in towns or during the transport. It would also allow the players
to trade units and weapons and to finish the game by destroying an enemy city. Nevertheless, it
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does not comply with the aim of this project, which is to create a game with strictly economical
goals.
Influence points Distribution In this section we will discuss how the player earns IP s.
Each time the player invests his resources he earns IP s equal to the real value of the resources
spent. Besides this there are two other ways to obtain IP s.
For creating a successful auction the player earns 1/10 of the real value of resources offered
in IP s.
The amount 1/10 may seem too much, however the point of the game is that the players use the
auctions, and therefore they have to be advantageous. Moreover using this setting the auction
allows the player to sell the resources for less than their actual cost without disadvantaging
himself.
If the player wins an auction he earns 1/10 of the real value of resources in the auction in
IP s. This should again force the players to participate and allow them to offer more than the
value expected since they gain extra IP s if they win.
Place Saving: After a certain amount of time the game reaches the limit when no more
buildings can be built because there is no more area available. The player’s aim is to have
one mine at the highest level possible and this means reducing the levels of other buildings or
reducing the investment to areas improvement. There are multiple ways of space saving:
• Reducing the Living area level. It must to be compensated by research (living area effi-
ciency or automation in stones, metals, minerals research).
• Reducing the Power station level. Rebuilding or energy production or efficiency help to
compensate.
• Investing in the research of areas improvement, which can gain extra space.
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2.2 Buildings
Figure 4: Graphic
representation of the
buildings in game
Each player can build and upgrade several types of buildings. Up-
grades can be understood as an extension of the area the building oc-
cupies. Degrading a building means vacating the occupied areas. Each
extension or downgrade costs resources and affects the parameters of
the building.
The growth of the parameters (which include cost and time) can’t be
linear. If it were, focusing on one resource would not be advantageous
for the player. It is necessary to have the players focus on one resource
in order to make the environment more competitive. In this work we
use exponential increase with the basis of 1.3. This is applied to all the
buildings, since with the exception of the Research lab all the buildings
influence the production and it would be problematic if for example
the parameters of the power stations increased linearly but the energy needed would increase
exponentially. The research lab and the living area upgrades are also exponential since they
both depend on other exponentially increasing values such as population or energy.
The number of buildings and building upgrades is limited with the exception of the research
labs. This also makes it advantageous to focus on only one resource. At the start of the game
each player builds buildings until he reaches the maximal limit. Then the players start to do
research lab improvements until it is advantageous to downgrade one building and upgrade
another in its place. Building downgrade is cheaper than upgrade and if the player does it no
IP s are lost. The player does not earn any IP s from degrading buildings. The limitation on the
number of buildings is imposed since the area of the city (default IP ) is limited and at a certain
point there is no more place to expand. Various types of buildings will now be described.
2.2.1 Living Area
This structure increases the player’s population. It allows player to prevent sanctions of
overpopulation. Moreover the player’s population pays taxes which are the main way of earning
money.
2.2.2 Power Stations
There are three kinds of power stations. Each player starts with a thermal power station
which is less effective than the other kinds. Later he can do some research which allows him to
build other types. The main purpose to increase the production of energy.
• The nuclear power station is more expensive than the thermal power station but the
14
production is tripled.
• The fusion power station is more expensive than the nuclear power station but the pro-
duction is four times bigger.
2.2.3 Mines
As there are three main resources that can be mined, there are also three types of mines.
Their cost, production, research and needs should be balanced. The default cost of each mine is
the same, however in different resources. All of the mines also have the same energy consumption
and population required.
2.2.4 Research Lab
This structure allows the players to do research. In order to build a research lab it is necessary
to have a thermal power station at level 3 or more.
2.3 Research
Figure 5: Graphic
representation of the
research in game
Research improves production, allows the players to build other build-
ings etc.
It can be upgraded in the same way as the buildings. If upgraded,
it earns the player some research points and then it is possible to select
out of different directions of upgrade. The amount of points earned is
the same as the level of research. Each level raises exponentially the
cost and time of the next upgrade. It is not permitted to have the level
of a research higher than than of the research lab. Each player should
be careful with upgrades. It is impossible to withdraw points that are
once placed, and since the cost of research is high, the player might not
be able to compete in auctions.
As opposed to the buildings, the effects of research improvement are
not exponential. The increase of production is 1% of default production
per point. The upgrades that lower the costs are usually set to -0,5% of
current cost per point. Various types of research will now be described.
2.3.1 Energy Technology
There are three possible directions of research in this field. Energy efficiency reduces the
power consumed by buildings. Energy technologies allow the players to rebuild their power
stations. Rebuilding costs some money but may save a lot of building area. Energy production
increases the production of the players’ power stations.
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2.3.2 Living and Building Area Improvement
In this field is is also possible to invest to three different areas. Space living area efficiency
increases the player’s population per level. Rebuilding allows the players to rebuild their living
area and change its default parameters, which is a way to save space. The third possible direction
is the expansion of the building area, which only comes to effect after a certain amount of points
is invested in it, but when it does it doubles the player’s building limit.
2.3.3 Stone, Metal or Mineral Production
Each of the mines presents three possibilities of improvement. Production and efficiency
both function in the same way as in case of energy technology. The third possibility is the
automation which reduces the population needed to work in the mine.
2.3.4 Espionage Technology
The last research also has three areas of development. By investing into spying the player
increases his chance to gain private information about the movements of his opponent. Defence
protects the player’s private information from the other players.
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3 Auctions
In this section we will describe the main auction mechanisms of the game and present the
definitions of the auction types.
3.1 Auction Types Used in Game
For the purposes of this game we have chosen three of the most common auction types:
1) English auction (with or without buyout option available),
2) Vickrey auction,
3) and Dutch auction.
Each player can decide to use any auction type he wants.
1) English auction is a widely spread auction type. Unless he is the highest bidder, each
agent can bid the minimal amount over the present bid, or more with the condition of overbidding
the current highest bid. The minimal amount in the game depends on the real value of the goods.
The ending in our case comes when no new bids are placed for a certain amount of time. When
the auction ends the highest bidder wins the item and pays the highest bid. In some cases there
is a possibility to win an item immediately without contest but usually by paying more money.
This option is called buyout and in our case it is set by a seller.( [3],pages 699–738),( [4], page
331)
2) Vickrey auction is sealed-bid second-price auction. The bidders’ bids are written on a
paper and are not revealed. When everyone has bid, the auction ends, the winner being the
highest bidder who pays the second highest bid that has been placed. ( [4], page 331)
3) Dutch auction is an auction where the auctioneer gives the starting price of the object.
During the auction the price decreases and at the moment when there is an agent who can afford
to pay for the goods the auction ends. In the game the amount by which the price decreases
depends on the real value of the goods. The winner is the one that accepted and he pays the
current price. This type of auction is often used when the goods need to be sold quickly (for
example if they are perishable).( [3],pages 699–738),( [4], page 331)
Multiple Resources in One Auction In the game there is a possibility to create an auction
with more than one resource type. For English auction we used an algorithm with the same
principle as the one described in MAS.( [4],page 34) This auction system is set to bring maximal
earnings to the seller. It means that each item is sold for the biggest offer even if it means that
the different items in the auction are sold to multiple agents. It is in fact the same as if the
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auction were split into two or more auctions selling one item. In the other auction types all is
sold to one bidder. This leads to higher revenue in case of the English auction because of the
possibility to select only one resource. It maximises the revenue for each of the resource types
offered and it is better than if two or more auctions were joint together.
3.2 Definition of Auction
Definition: Bayesian Game In the next step we will define the auction as a Bayesian game.
Before that let us define Bayesian game using one of the definitions ( [4], 6.3). Bayesian game
setting is a quintuplet (N,O,Θ, p, u), where
• N is a finite set of n agents;
• O is a set of outcomes;
• Θ = Θ1 × ...×Θn is a set of possible joint vectors;
• p is the probability distribution on Θ; and
• u = (ui, ..., un), where ui : O ×Θ 7→ R is an utility function for each player i.
Mechanism of Bayesian game setting if a pair (A,M), where
• A = A1 × ...×An, where Ai is a set of actions available to player i ∈ N and
• M : A 7→ Π(O) maps each action profile to a distribution over outcomes. (Π(O) is the set
of all probability distributions over O)
Together, a Bayesian game setting and a mechanism define a Bayesian game.
Definition: Quasilinear Mechanism Because the utility functions in an auction setting are
assumed to be quasilinear I will now define a quasilinear setting ( [4],10.3.2). A mechanism in
the quasilinear setting is a triple (A,χ,p).
• A = A1 × ...×An, where Ai is a set of actions available to player i ∈ N ,
• χ : A 7→ Π(X) maps each action profile to a distribution over choices, and
• p : A 7→ Rn maps each action profile to a payment for each agent.
Here we have just changed the definition of mechanism of Bayesian setting by splitting the
function M into functions χ and p.
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Definition: Auction as a Bayesian Game Next definition ( [4],10.3.2) . Now basic auction
environment can be finally defined. To define an auction as a quasilinear mechanism we must
identify the following elements:
• set of i agents, where i = 1, . . ., N,
• set of outcomes O = X × Rn,
• set of actions that each agent i can do Ai,
• choice function o that selects one of the outcomes given the agents’ actions and
• payment function p that determines what each agent must pay given all agents’ actions.
to complete the definition we need to specify two other components:
first of them is an utility function that quasilinear setting allows us to write ( [4],10.3) ui(o, θi) =
ui(x, θi)− fi(pi). The function fi indicates player risk attitude and ui is utility function.
The second one is the way in which the agents make their evaluations. The auction algorithms
that the AI player uses are independent private value or dependant private value. The selection
of algorithm depends on the level of the AI player.
19
4 AI Players
In this section we will discuss the AI player’s behaviour and explain the player’s strategy as
well as the way in which he improves his city.
Levels The game offers two levels of AI player with only a two differences between them.
• Beginner
At the beginner level the production of the player is slightly reduced and he uses indepen-
dent private values even though he is risk affected same as the intermediate player.
• Intermediate
The intermediate player’s production is not reduced and he uses dependent private values
in the simplified form described in 5.4.2.
4.1 Basic Behaviour
Strategy: Each AI player first chooses a strategy, which is a vector of numbers that says which
decisions the player will make. First of all the player decides on a resource focus strategy. This
is represented by one number generated at random that says which resource the player will focus
on. This is all that the player needs to know for deciding about the buildings. Depending on
this selection, the other numbers are chosen. These numbers determine the way in which the
research will be upgraded. The player focuses on producing the biggest amount of the main
resource possible but in other research he still proceeds randomly. If an investment complying
with the strategy is not possible the player randomly selects a way to upgrade any research.
(Some research ways lock after reaching a certain level.)
It would also be possible to include the option of changing the strategy during the game.
The idea of changing the main resource if the original resource is not produced enough in the
game according to exchange rates was considered but rejected because refocusing to another
resource would cost much more than it brings. It would mean stopping to upgrade the current
main mine and building another. This would result in problems with the building area, which
is quickly used up. Downgrades would be needed and that would mean further loss of resources
and IP s. The result would be great delay behind the rest of players which may cause the loss
of the game. It would also bring the problematic situations resulting from more players at once
deciding to change resource. Such situation would just move the problem of unbalance from one
resource to the other.
The AI players do not learn during the game. It surely is possible but it is rather the part
of the future work than this thesis.
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Saving Money: The first problem that the players have to solve is how much money to leave
aside in order to stay competitive throughout all the auctions. The amount will change during
the game as all the productions and auction values gradually rise. It can be easily defined as
the expected value of the biggest auction that can appear. However in many cases this value
is unknown. In such instance the player takes the double of the biggest bid that appeared as a
point of reference. The reason for this is that if the auctions occur simultaneously and there are
one to five auctions the player can place a bid in any of them.
Of course at the start of the game no bid has been placed yet, and therefore the AI players
have some default amount of money that they leave aside. At the beginning of the game there
is nothing to spend it on so the actual players cannot take an advantage of this fact. Players are
allowed to invest money that they earn through direct trade, which takes place without auction
but is disadvantageous.
Exchange Rates: The players can see the exchange rates which helps them to decide in certain
situations, for example which mine to upgrade first. The exchange rates show the current value
of the resource in the game and depends on production.
4.2 Building Selection
The first step is to browse all the buildings and to define and forbid those that are too expensive
to build. Usually only one possibility remains. The decision depends on energy, population as
well as the player’s strategy. If the available selection still contains 2 or more buildings, the AI
selects one at random.
Conditions for Building Selection: In order for the player to select a building it must
satisfy these conditions:
• There must be enough space to build it. In case the limit is reached, no more buildings
are allowed.
• The population and the energy limits must be high enough. The player will not overstep
those limits if it is disadvantageous. He calculates the reductions needed to avoid penal-
izations and than decides if he benefits from the upgrade. If this condition is not satisfied
he can build only living area or power stations.
• The player needs to have enough resources available to invest in constructing the building.
• There has to be a need for the new building. If the player’s production is sufficient, he
does not require another building.
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• The ratio between the resources and production has to be observed. As the player is
focused on one resource, he must keep the production of the building that produces it
higher than the others even though upgrading the others is cheaper. Furthermore he
needs to keep the other two mines in certain ratio.
Production Reduction: The AI player reduces the production in mines usually because it
is needed to avoid penalizations from energy or population overflow. He reduces the production
in all the mines until the required decrease is achieved. The research lab production is kept at
0% except when the AI player needs to do research. In case of the research lab the AI player
does not consider the population and energy debt as in case of the other buildings. If he needs
to do a research he sets the power in research lab to the required amount and than reduces the
production of the other buildings until the debt is avoided. After doing a research the research
lab production falls to 0% and the production of other buildings rises to 100%.
Simple Planning: Assuming that the player has enough resources to build more than one
building but does not have enough power, he will build a power station. The power station
usually requires higher level and takes more time to build than other buildings. Due to these
conditions the AI player would not be able to build any other buildings during its construction.
Because of this the AI player considers his future population and energy capacity instead of the
current (he counts the buildings under construction as if they were finished). Therefore when
he starts upgrading the power station the AI player simultaneously starts to upgrade as many
buildings as possible. They are often finished before the power station in which case the player
lowers the buildings’ production until the power station is built in order to avoid an energy
debt. However, it is advantageous to build the buildings simultaneously with the power station
because that way they are sooner operational. The same principle is also applied to the living
area.
Production Regulation: The AI player’s secondary mines have much lower production than
the main one. The AI player keeps the ratio between the secondary mines and the main one
to 2:3 calculated in IP s. The ratio between the secondary mines’ productions depends on the
availability of the resources in the game and does not depend on the demand of the players
because due to our effort to keep the game balanced, the demand for all the resources is forced
to be the same.
Rebuilding: As part of some strategies the AI player has the possibility to rebuild his power
station. These rebuilds are expensive but may bring income by reducing the building area
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required. The AI always prefers to rebuild the power station. The possibility of rebuilds depends
on research, without which no rebuilds are available.
4.3 Research Selection
In order to make a selection the AI player browses all the types of research and decides which
can be upgraded. Unlike the building selection, the selection of research does not depend on
energy, population and free space.
Conditions: in order for a type of research to be upgraded, it must satisfy these conditions:
• The Research Lab level must be greater than the current research level, even if the power
is reduced.
• The player must have enough resources to invest in making the upgrade.
Strategies The distribution of points fully depends on the AI player’s strategy. In each of the
strategies it is strictly defined in which direction each research develops.
In the following sections we will discuss how AI players behave in auctions.
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5 AI Players Participating in Auctions
In this chapter we will discuss the mechanisms used in the decisions of the AI players in each
of the auction types. Firstly we will describe how the player decides when to create an auction,
then the rules for choosing an auction if more are available, then the process by which the seller
decides when to accept an auction and finally how the bidder decides whether to participate in
an auction or not.
5.1 When to Create an Auction
Since each player has one resource on which he primarily focuses, this resource can be taken
as a starting point. The time to create an auction can be specified as the time when the player
has more of some resource than he needs. Having more than he needs can be defined as the
reserve being enough to pay the most expensive upgrade among the buildings, research etc. It is
not strategic to create an auction with almost zero resources stack since there is a fixed amount
the player must pay to create an auction. It means that the AI player waits until he satisfies
the following conditions.
5.1.1 Smart Starting Value
The player has to choose an auction parameter (AP ) depending on the progress of the game.
The initial idea was that the average auction value can be easily calculated from the last 5
samples, so that the player has one number which should be approximately the auction value.
The game needs to go from small to larger amounts, which is why it is necessary to make the
AP slightly higher. This can be done for example by counting the highest sample twice or by
not using smaller samples than the smallest one.
Ultimately this idea was rejected as problematic. In case of this solution the player would
use samples from past auctions to create new auctions that would ultimately become samples
as well. This leads to the following problems:
• The bounds are unstable, so the game can lead to wrong values.
• The raising of auctions’ prices would be uncontrollable. The growth of the value of the
auctions would be uncertain because of probability distribution and the game progress
would be changing dramatically from game to game.
• The starting samples would have to be set and the game would have to be continued
depending on those values. In such case the starting value would have huge effect on the
game.
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• The AP would have to be recalculated after each successfully ended auction which is not
optimal for implementation.
The solution we used is to take the amount of resources the player will generate in certain time
interval as a default value. This setting can be easily controlled. Each player decides with-
out regard to the other players and can create auctions with almost the same time intervals.
Therefore the AP is certain, stable and much easier to control. This situation also requires the
starting value to be set. Otherwise the AI player would start creating auctions directly from
the start, spending a lot of the starting resources and slowing himself down. After reaching the
starting value his AP s will not depend on it and therefore it can be set with no strong influence
on the game.
5.1.2 Exact Value Selection
The type of probability distribution we used in the game is a Gaussian distribution with
maximum in the value we have. This causes the probability of selection to be highest in the
exact value selected (AP ) and on both sides to fall to almost 0. In this way the solution corre-
sponds to reality.
The first step to determine when the player creates an auction is:
g∗(x) = 1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 , where µ = 0 and σ = 1.
After including all known parameters and shifting the function g∗(x) and applying it to interval
< 23AP ;
4
3AP > which is the tolerance for the player to create an auction with the Gaussian
probability distribution on this interval we get the function g(x):
g(x) = 1√
2pi
e
−
(
7.5(x−AP )
AP
)2
Then a number x is selected at random from 〈min(g∗(x));max(g∗(x))〉, where Df : g ∗ (x) ∈
〈−5, 5〉. Because g(x) is a shifted even function it has no inversion for the whole domain. It
must be split into two intervals by randomly generating an n, n ∈ {−1; 1}.
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Figure 7: Function g(x), probability distribution of the player’s decision
5.2 Choosing an Auction
At any time during the game no more than 5 auctions are revealed to bid. The player bids in
every auction allowed, because even if he does not need the resource he can still sell it through
direct trade, so there always exists a value for which it is advantageous to bid. Moreover
the investment to the unwanted auction is so low that it will not affect the more important
investments. Furthermore, the small bid will be quickly overbid by other players so there is no
loss of money.
5.3 Seller’s Decision
In the setting of the game the auction is often advantageous for the seller even if he sells
the resources for slightly less than their expected price (he gets some IPs just for creating the
successful auction).Selling an item is advantageous when the sum of the real value of the auction
and the small amount needed to create the auction (BA) is bigger than what the seller gains.
The seller’s income consists of the IP value of the money he earns and 10% of the auction’s real
value, which is the IP reward he earns for a successful auction 7.
The condition can be expressed as:
if RV +BA < ME + 0, 1RV , where RV is auction value in IP s and ME is money earned.
As the ratio between money and IP s is 1:1 we can simplify it to
7See 2.1 IP distributing
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BA < 0, 1RV
The seller’s income s can be expressed as:
s = HBV − 0, 9RV −BA where HBV is the value the goods were sold for.
We can see from this equation that if the highest bidder gives the RV ,the earn of the seller will
still be 0, 1RV −BA.
5.4 Bidder’s Decision
In this part of the thesis we will explain how the AI player decides about his bids in auctions.
We will also discuss the dependence of private values and risk attitudes.
5.4.1 Risk Neutral Agents with Independent Private Values
Common Values: The simplest way to apprise goods are common values. To calculate
common values CV in the game we first need a real value RV . RV is used for translating
each of the resources to IP s:
RV = a+ 1, 5b+ 3c, where a/b/c = amount of stones/metals/minerals.
Players usually have to reckon with the income in case of winning the auction which is 10% of
RV . It means that for the game we will calculate CV as:
CV = RV + 0, 1RV = 1, 1RV
Agents can go as far as this limit, when they want to have profit greater than or equal to 0.
Then the winner’s income w can be calculated as:
w = CV − P , where P is the payment that the winner must make.
Private Values: The AI players do not use the common values to evaluate the goods. The
reason for this is that in such case the players would bid until they reached the same amount
and the last player to bid would win the auction because no one else would be able to continue
bidding (the values would be the same). Instead, each player calculates his own value of the
goods that depends on the common value but can differ significantly.
It is necessary to find the minimum and maximum values that the players will be able to bid.
The player bids the minimum in case when he does not need the resources in the auction at all,
only to sell them through the direct trade. The minimal bid value can be set as:
MB = DTM + 0, 1RV , where DTM is the value in money if sold though the direct trade.
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The situation with maximal value is rather similar. When it is more advantageous to buy the
resource trough the direct trade, the player will buy it there. In the direct trade the player must
calculate with the RV not the CV as in the auction. The highest bid the player will place is:
HB = DTRS + 0, 1RV , where DTRS is the IP value of resources from direct trade.
The production increase brought about by the resources from a win in an auction seems to be a
great private evaluation for the players. However, usually the investments do not directly affect
the production. It might be calculated in certain cases but it would be more complicated than
useful. Therefore the need for a resource should depend on three factors:
• The amount of the resource the player already has.
• The time that the player would need to get the amount of resource himself.
• The availability of the resource on global scale.
The solution we used in the game is that the AI player takes into consideration a part of the
resources he has (a part because it is a way to avoid coincidence in case he just earned resources
from another auction but did not produce them himself) and than measures the time until he
will reach the amount offered in the auction by his own production (parameter t). This time is
than what matters in setting the private value. The function that calculates the private value
has certain conditions that need to be fulfilled:
• The extremes are MB in time 0 and HB in time ∞.
• The function must be increasing in (0;∞〉.
• The dependence on time must correspond to reality.
It is better to split the function into a number of intervals since its behaviour differs for each
interval. PV (t) =

MB + (CV −MB) et
et1
; t ∈ (0, t1〉
CV + 0,5CV t(t2−t1) ; t ∈ (t1, t2〉
1, 5CV + HB−1,5CVpi (arctan(t3 − t2) + arctan(t− t3)) t ∈ (t2,∞)
.
For the interval t ∈ (0, t1〉 the PV (t) is an exponential function. The reason for this is that
it is an interval where the player has enough of the resource and he does not need it at all. He
prefers it only if he can trade it without costs. Then, before the time t1, the need rises and the
player starts to ascribe higher value to the resource. The extreme increase is necessary in the
last few seconds before t1. The time t1 in the figure 8 is set to 20 sec. which is quite a long time
but each player can wait this long without high losses.
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Figure 8: An example of the function PV (t) for IPV,RN case
For the interval t ∈ (t1, t2〉 the PV (t) is a linear function. Most of the players should be
situated in this interval and therefore it is quite long. The increase is linear from CV to 1, 5CV
and the increasing is slow. There is no reason for the increasing to be different around t1 and
t2. The upper limit of the function is 1, 5CV . Time t2 in the figure 8 is set to 2 minutes.
The last interval is between t2 and ∞. This interval includes the next value (t3) and the
function is a kind of arctangent. The third value depends on the inflection point of the arctan-
gent, so the point where the function breaks from almost constant to extremely increasing can
be shifted. In this case the exponential could not have been used because the function needs
to be converging when t → ∞. In the program the ∞ cannot be reached, so there is a t4 from
which the t is large enough. t3 in the figure 8 is set to 3 minutes and from 4th minute (in the
figure 8) it is counted as ∞.
The availability of the resource is included because MB and HB depends on it.
Utility Function for Independent Private Values: The result of PV (t) is the value the
player is able to pay for the goods. The utility function depends on the auction type, because
strategies vary. For simplification the utility function (u∗) is normalised for the game (has min-
imum 0 and maximum 1). The utility function can reach the value under 0 but those values
have the same effect as the utility of 0 in risk neutral setting.
English and Vickrey Auction: The best strategy for these two types of auctions is the dominant
strategy. (Proof [4],11.1.3) As in the Vicrey auction there is only one chance to bid, the best
idea is to bid the PV . In the English auction the player can win sooner than the PV is reached,
so the strategy is to raise bids only for a small amount until the PV level is reached or no one
continues bidding. The utility function u(t, bi) = u∗(t, bi) can be described as:
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u(t, bi) = u
∗(t, bi) = 1− biPV , where bi is the bid the player is going to offer.
At the moment u∗ reaches the PV the utility becomes 0 and then the player refuses to bid more.
Dutch Auction: In the Dutch auction the situation is different. According to MAS [4] the player
should suppose his evaluation is the highest since if it were not he would not win the auction
in any auction system used. If the player supposes his evaluation is the highest he will pay less
than his PV to save money. To win the auction he has to pay the second highest valuation.
This system works if the players have the same evaluation of the goods. But in the game the
players’ evaluations are completely different and each player only knows his own. The utility
function will be quite similar to the English one.
u(t, bi) = u
∗(t, bi) = 1− EV2ndPV , where EV2nd is the expected value of player with 2nd highest
evaluation. Expected prices are further discussed in 5.5.3.
The Revenue equivalence theorem says that for IPV case with neutral agents the revenue
from all the mentioned auction types is the same. It is described in more detail in
MAS ( [4],11.1.4).
5.4.2 Risk Affected Agents Independent Private Values
In this chapter we will discuss the risk attitude of agents. Certain agents will prefer to enter
risky situations more often and to risk more even against the rules of probability. The risk
attitudes affect bidding differently in each auction type.
• In English auction the risk seeking player may go further in bidding just to increase the
highest bid even though he does not want the goods for such an amount. This either makes
the other player pay more than they otherwise would or it leads to winning the auction
for a price overstepping the value. Therefore this strategy brings negative outcome either
to the opponent or to the player himself. The risk averse players in English auction act as
risk neutral but in case they use affiliated values (see 5.4.2) they leave sooner because they
are afraid of risk seeking agents. Normally they would leave the auction sooner in case of
IPV as well, however as they can see how the bids increase they do not risk anything until
their PV is reached. Therefore they can be tricked by the risk seeking agents into offering
more but still don’t overstep their personal evaluating.
• In Dutch auction the risk attitudes work with different system. The risk attitude in Dutch
auction depends on when the player accepts the bid. Because of the strategy that the AI
players use, the risk attitude manifests in their underestimating or overestimating the EV
of second player. Therefore it is possible for a risk seeking player to win some auctions
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with smaller loss with the disadvantage of loosing auctions more often. If the EV is
underestimated the agent is risk seeking. In case it is overestimated, the agent is risk
averse.
• In Vicrey auction not bidding PV is not risky but ineffective because the value for which
the goods is sold does not depend on the winner. The risk seeking players prefer to bid
more and risk that they can sometimes win the goods for a higher price than they expected
to pay. The risk averse players do not bid less than their PV because it would be pointless.
The risk averse player in Vicrey auction works as risk neutral even though the values are
affiliated.
There another aspect that might affect the risk attitude of the player but is not implemented
in the game. It can be explained on the example of two players: one is rich and one is poor. For
the rich one it is not risky to spend the maximum amount that the poor one can afford, however
if the poor one bids all his money he takes a serious risk. The reason for not implementing this
in the game even though it is an interesting idea is that the money investments and incomes
change too often and for unpredictable amounts.
For risk dependent agents u(t, bi) 6= u∗(t, bi), u(t, bi) = u∗(t, bi)− f(pi). This means that the
utility is reduced or raised by the effect of risk attitude. f(pi) = ±(1 − 2bi/PVri(2bi/PV )), where bi is
the future bid and ri are functions from figure 9. The sign depends on the auction type and on
the direction in which the risk attitude affects the utility. pi (payment) in f(pi) is included as
a bid (bi), because in the game the bid is what the agents have to pay once the auction ends.
As the risk seeking and averse strategies change in different auction types the f(pi) varies too,
to be precise the sign is what changes.
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Figure 9: Risk attitudes, curves r1−3
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Figure 10 shows the valuation of a bid depending on the PV of the players. In the case
of neutral agents the image is exactly the bid. A function f(ri) is specified with the following
conditions:
• f(ri) = 0 for each PV if agent is risk neutral (n = 1), it says that the utility function does
not change for risk neutral players.
• f(ri) <> 0 for not neutral agents and the value of f(bi = PV ) should be different for
agents with different risk attitudes. This explains multiplying by 2. Otherwise if bi = PV
this condition will be false. With coefficient of 2 the risk function f(ri) works great in the
situation when bi = PV which is fulfilled in the game.
Risk neutrality is represented by the blue line in figure 9. It is a linear function r1(x) : y = x.
The risk neutrality does not affect the utility function of an agent, because this equation is
always true: f(pi) =
2bi/PV
ri(2bi/PV )
− 1 = bibi − 1 = 0. (The example is valid for Dutch auction,
for English and Vickrey auctions f(pi)V i,En = −f(pi)Du. (bi is replaced with EV2nd for Dutch
auction.)
Risk aversion is represented by the red curve in figure 9.It is r2(x) : y = xn, where n < 1
(for the curve in figure 9 n is set to 0, 5). The risk aversion reduces the utility function of an
agent since the value reaches PV/2 and rises it for higher values, because for (PV/2;PV 〉 this
equation is always true: f(pi) =
2bi/PV
ri(2bi/PV )
− 1 = 2bi/PV(2bi/PV )n − 1 > 0. (The example is for English
auction, for Dutch auction f(pi)En = −f(pi)Du and PV is replaced with EV2nd and for Vickrey
auction the f(pi) = 0)
Risk seeking is represented by the green curve in figure 9. It is r3(x) : y = xn, where n < 1
(for the curve in figure 9 n is set to 2 ). The risk seeking rises the utility function of an agent
since the value reaches PV/2 and reduces it for smaller values, because for (PV/2;PV 〉 this
equation is always true: f(pi) =
2bi/PV
ri(2bi/PV )
− 1 = 2bi/PV(2bi/PV )n − 1 < 0. The example is for English
and Vickrey auction, for Dutch and Vickrey auctions f(pi)V i,En = −f(pi)Du)
if n ∈ 〈0, 84; 1, 14〉 than the results of the utility function change by 10% for both sides. (See
figure 10)
Using this in the game an infinite amount of agents with different risk attitudes can be cre-
ated from just 1 randomly selected number (nd).
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Choosing n The n that defines the risk attitude of a player is generated at the start of the
game randomly. For the game n ∈ 〈0, 84; 1, 14〉 8. The probability for risk aversion and risk
seeking must be the same. In the interval of the game it means generating whether the player
is risk seeking or risk averse and than the exact value.
The revenues from the auctions vary except in case of the risk neutral player. In Dutch auc-
tion the revenue for the risk averse player rises but for risk seeking player decreases compared
with English and Vickrey auctions. This is because the risk seeking agents estimate the highest
opponent’s expected value to be lower which means that their utility will be higher if they win
but with bigger risk to take. The situation with risk averse players is the exact opposite. The
revenue equivalence between English and Vickrey auction remains.
5.4.3 Risk Affected and Dependent Private Values
Expected Value In the next paragraph we will discuss affiliated values. However first we
need to discuss how one player (player A) decides about the evaluation of another (player B).
These estimated values are called expected values (EV ). The EV depends on what each player
knows about the others. The information each player has is affected by his espionage technology
research:
• The player A has no information:
If the player A has no information he has to choose a reasonable EV for example the value
1, 25CV . 1, 25CV is the mean of the longest interval for the function from figure 8.
• The player has information about building’s levels:
If player A has information about the building levels he can calculate the income for each
8 It influences utility by ±10%.
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building but with possible fallacy due to research. Nevertheless it is the best assumption
player A can make. As the starting value of the resources player A takes the amount of
resource that player B generates in t1 (see 5.4.1) sec. if he has no researches done. The
EV can’t be exact due to the limits of information player A possesses. At this point we
could consider correcting the error margin by the value calculated from the research of
player A, however the research levels and directions are so variable that it would not make
much sense.
• The player also has information about the other players’ resources:
In this case the player A still cannot calculate the exact income but he knows the real
starting value and therefore the EV is much more precise. The problem with income
calculation is avoided here because the AI players are limited by programmed behaviour.
It can be explained by the spies not being good enough to earn information regularly and
precisely.
• The player has all the information about other players’ resources and income:
Since the player A knows all he needs, he can count the EV with accuracy.
Affiliated Values (simplified method) In some cases the value of an object can change
only by revealing the scale of demand. Due to this fact for example the value of an item in
English auction can rise with each bid. If the demand is high the buyer is ensured that he can
sell the goods whenever he wants and therefore he continues bidding over his PV .
Affiliated values should include the others players’ expected values into the player’s strategy
of evaluating goods. It means that the PV of the player depends on the EV of the others. For
the game the affiliated value is set as:
AV = PV +
n∑
i 6=j
βEVi, where β ∈ Rn;βi ∈ 〈 0,25n−1 ; 1n−1〉.
As the expected values are not exact β should vary. The value of beta depends on the information
the player has and in the game β = {1;0,75;0,5;0,25}n−1 and in the place of EVi is EVi − PV , which
signifies the differences from the players’ expected values. It means that finally:
AV = PV +
n∑
i 6=j
β(EVi − PV ), where β ∈ Rn;βi ∈ 〈 0,25n−1 ; 1n−1〉.
In this case the AV is used instead of the PV for the function u. The AV is calculated each time
any player is going to bid, not only before the auction as in the preceding cases. For example
each time any player in the English auction bids more than the expected value, his expected
value is corrected and the other player’s AV is recalculated, increasing slightly. The PV and the
other players’ values stay constant so they do not compensate for the increase of AV and the
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AV rises. The same principle works in the Dutch auction. If the goods is not sold yet but the
expected value says it should be, the player can adjust his information which leads to a small
decrease of AV . Moreover, since for the Dutch auction the player needs the second highest EV ,
it is also calculated as affiliated.
The revenues in the DPV the case is also different for each auction type. The English auction
usually brings the highest revenue compared with IPV as the values are affected one by the
other while revealing the demand for the goods. The Dutch auction generates smaller revenue
in case of the DPV than in IPV since the seller’s income is affected by the concealment of his
information. In this case the information is revealed if the item is not bought in at the time
when the player expects it. As we have already mentioned, he can than edit the expected value
of the player who failed to buy the item, which reduces his own AV .
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6 Summary
The result of this thesis is a multi-player game that allows the player to invest in buildings,
researches and mines and to improve his city in order to achieve economic dominance. The
success in the game depends mainly on the player’s ability to sell his resources in auctions and
to win the auctions created by the other players. During the game the player should grasp
the differences between the various auction systems and observe the behaviour of the artificial
intelligence (AI).
With regard to the AI, the player cannot see the processes directing the AI players while
playing the normal version of the game. However, this thesis also contains an observer version
of the game. In this version the player has a possibility to switch between all the AI players
and better observe their behaviour. There are 2 levels of AI players implemented in the game,
the beginner and intermediate player each with different building productions and behaviour in
auctions.
The multi-player is not implemented in the game since it would require an internet connection
for the players, which is not included for time reasons. The game allows for one to eight AI
players and one or no real player (the maximum number of players is 8).
An improvement would be to include the statistics of the AI players successes in fighting
against human players. It definitely should be a part of the thesis although unfortunately it was
not possible to obtain these statistics due to the size of the other parts of this thesis.
7 Future Work
As we have already mentioned in the Introduction, the game offers many possibilities for
extension. In this chapter we will mention some of the ways in which further improvements
could be realized.
The first major improvement, as already mentioned, would be to finish the multi-player
option. The game might be an interesting way of spending time with friends if it included
multi-player via internet.
It would also be useful to do some testing of the game in order to bring more balance to it,
especially concerning the AI and the balance in research and buildings. Some kind of testing by
real players should reveal the main problems and possible disparities. In case of the AI it might
be beneficial to write an algorithm to set up the constants more effectively (for example for the
PV calculating). In order to achieve balance we only need to change a few values, however what
makes this proposition impossible in the present moment is the amount of time that would be
spent in testing and statistics.
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Another way to improve the game with the information that the testing would bring concerns
the graphics environment, which might be more intuitive. Further opportunity to make the
game better would be adding transports in the game. Presently the resources in the game are
transferred immediately or by neutral transport ships but one of the initial ideas was to give it to
the players as another opportunity to gain IP s. It would include building a shipyard, producing
ships and also a strategy algorithm determining when it would be advantageous to do so, which
would depend on the position of the players around and of the player himself. Considering the
dangers which the transporting can posses such as pirates or other players’ ships might be an
interesting variation. The game could also have the added possibilities of attacking the enemy
cities, destroying buildings and ships, as well as investing into defence and stealing resources.
Lastly there is always possibility of further expanding the game by adding new buildings or
researches.
8 Conclusion
The game rewards planning, and information inference from the behaviour of other players.
Therefore it might be considered an interesting way to effectively learn something about auction
algorithms and multi-agent systems. The game also has the potential to become a part of a more
complex project, even though the implementation does not always fully support this option.
The environment in the game is competitive and cooperative at the same time. The players
compete each other in the effort to maximize their incomes through the trades. They try to
win auctions every time it is possible and to create auctions whenever they can. But they also
cooperate in a way because each player produces his main resource with the expectation that the
others have not had the same idea and therefore he becomes their main source of this resource,
and they in turn will have resources that he needs.
This thesis might also be taken as a starting point for others who are interested in AI or
multi-agent systems. The AI design can be used in various other works, for example as an easy
way to understand the basics of auction protocols or to provide material for others in the field
of creating AI.
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